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NOTES 
Dirty Digits  
THE COLLECTION OF POST-CUT-THROUGH DIALED 
DIGITS UNDER THE PEN/TRAP STATUTE 
INTRODUCTION 
Telephone users commonly pay outstanding bills or verify bank 
account balances by navigating an automated system and entering the 
appropriate digits. In some cases, a caller might dial digits to input 
personal information, such as a social security number or a pin number to 
access confidential accounts.1 Nevertheless, many telephone users would 
be disturbed to learn that law enforcement agencies may record and store 
indefinitely all of the digits dialed from a specific telephone without a 
warrant, without notification to the user, and without a showing of 
probable cause.2 
The device that enables law enforcement agencies to collect the 
outgoing digits a telephone user dials is called a pen register.3 Though at 
one time pen registers exclusively monitored telephones, today pen 
registers monitor communications conducted over a variety of electronic 
media.4 In the case of telephones, a pen register can record both the digits 
dialed to connect a telephone call to its destination and the digits dialed 
after connection occurs, such as those dialed to navigate automated 
  
 1 In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
328 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Because the names of the published orders this Note discusses are unwieldy, 
this Note will refer to the orders by the jurisdiction in which they were decided. Where a district has 
published more than one order, roman numerals indicate the chronological order in which the orders 
were issued. 
 2 See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF 
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 180 (1998). 
 3 Id. at 117. Pen registers perform the inverse function of trap-and-trace devices, which 
collect information about all calls received by a particular telephone. Id. The Pen/Trap Statute 
regulates both pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006) 
(“Pen/Trap Statute”). The statutory definition of a pen register is located in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) 
(“Definition”) and discussed in more detail in Parts I.A and I.C. 
 4 See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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menus.5 These latter digits are known as “post-cut-through dialed digits” 
(“PCTDDs”).6  
To date, researchers have failed to develop technology that can 
effectively screen PCTDDs that contain a telephone user’s substantive 
information, such as account or PIN numbers, from PCTDDs that do not 
contain substantive information, such as digits the user dials after being 
connected to a calling card company, which are technically PCTDDs but 
may also represent the actual destination of the telephone call.7 
Therefore, when using a pen register to collect all digits dialed by a 
particular telephone user, law enforcement agencies inevitably collect all 
PCTDDs dialed by the user to navigate automated systems, even when 
those digits contain the user’s substantive information. 
Between 2006 and 2008, six courts issued pen register orders 
denying the government’s application to install and use a pen register to 
collect all PCTDDs dialed by a subject telephone.8 Principally, this Note 
extracts from this series of pen register orders the three unique 
interpretations of the Pen/Trap Statute that informed the courts’ 
conclusions. Next, by analyzing those three perspectives in light of both 
the statutory text and the legislative history of the Pen/Trap Statute, this 
Note ultimately argues that the collection of PCTDDs that contain the 
substantive content of telephone users’ communications runs afoul of 
  
 5 See infra Part I.A. for a more detailed discussion of pen registers. See also U.S. 
Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 6 In re United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register 
and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone 
Tracking (S.D. Tex. I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
   7 In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d at 332 
n.5; see also U.S. Telecom, 227 F.3d at 462 (“Some post-cut-through dialed digits are telephone 
numbers, such as when a subject places a calling card, credit card, or collect call by first dialing a 
long-distance carrier access number and then, after the initial call is ‘cut through,’ dialing the 
telephone number of the destination party.”). 
 8 Each published pen register order denied a law enforcement agency’s application to 
record all digits dialed from a specific telephone using a pen register. See In re United States for an 
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device on Wireless Tele. Bearing 
Tele. No. [Redacted], Subscribed to [Redacted], Serviced By [Redacted] (E.D.N.Y. III), No. 08 MC 
0595, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101364, at *15-*16 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008); In re United States for 
an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices (E.D.N.Y. II), No. 
08-308, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97359, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2008); In re United States for an 
Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info. (S.D. Tex. II), No. H-07-613, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77635, at *34-*35 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007); E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339; In re 
Application of United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of a Pen Register and 
Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and (3) Cell Phone Tracking 
(S.D. Tex. I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re United States for an Order 
Authorizing the Installation and Use of an Elec. Computerized Data Collection Device Equivalent to 
a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, No. 06:06-mj-1130 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2006) (order 
affirming partial denial of application for the installation and use of pen register and trap and trade 
device). To date, no court has published an order granting such a request, although presumably such 
orders are granted routinely. 
2009] THE COLLECTION OF PCTDD’S WITH A PEN REGISTER 1111 
both the Pen/Trap Statute and the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution9 and should be prohibited. 
Specifically, in Part I, this Note briefly reviews relevant 
background information about pen register technology, as well as the 
common-law and statutory provisions that restrict the use of pen registers 
and the collection of content by law enforcement agencies. In Part II, this 
Note emphasizes the interplay between two provisions of the Pen/Trap 
Statute—18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 3123(7)—which has given 
rise to the three prominent and conflicting interpretations of the Pen/Trap 
Statute. By viewing these interpretations in light of traditional canons of 
statutory interpretation and the statute’s legislative history, Part II 
concludes that the Pen/Trap Statute should not be viewed as authorizing 
the use of pen registers to collect PCTDDs that contain content. 
Specifically, because the Fourth Amendment most likely protects 
PCTDDs that contain content, the canon of constitutional avoidance 
suggests that future courts should interpret the Pen/Trap Statute to 
prohibit the collection of PCTDDs that contain content. 
Building on Part II’s discussion, Part III.A presents this Note’s 
primary conclusion, which is that the statutory ambiguity should be 
cured by either amending or eliminating 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c). Part III.B 
briefly summarizes suggestions made by other commentators who have 
advocated general amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute. Finally, Part IV 
reemphasizes the conclusion that the collection of content in the form of 
PCTDDs is unconstitutional and urges Congress to take steps to prevent 
the continuation of this practice. 
I.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEN REGISTERS AND THE 
COLLECTION OF CONTENT 
Part I.A explains what a pen register is and traces its evolution 
from a device that originally assisted telephone service providers in the 
ordinary course of business, to a tool that law enforcement agencies 
routinely employ during investigations. Part I.B explores judicial 
limitations imposed on the government’s ability to intercept the content 
of electronic communications, including its use of pen registers, in a 
series of Supreme Court decisions. These decisions in turn have 
informed Congressional action with respect to pen registers, including 
the original passage of and later amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute, 
which Part I.C addresses in detail. The brief review of this well-trodden 
history sets the stage for Part II’s analysis of the recent pen register 
orders and the Pen/Trap Statute’s ambiguous text. 
  
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
1112 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
A. Identifying a Pen Register 
Telephone service providers use pen registers in the ordinary 
course of business to perform monthly billing operations and to prevent 
illegal and fraudulent uses of telephone lines.10 Yet, as a result of the 
inherent value of the information that pen registers collect, pen registers 
are also important for law enforcement agencies conducting 
investigations into criminal activities.11 No available statistics tabulate 
the total number of pen register applications approved in the United 
States for law enforcement agents.12 However, one commentator 
estimated that in 2007 alone, that figure was at least 60,000.13 
Whether or not a particular device is a pen register depends on 
the exact capabilities of the device in light of the statutory definition of a 
pen register.14 Because technology and statutes constantly evolve, 
judicial conceptions15 and statutory definitions16 of a pen register have 
also changed over time.17 The current statutory definition of a pen 
register contains expansive language that resulted from amendments 
intended to allow pen registers to monitor activities conducted over a 
variety of digital mediums, including digital telephones, cellular phones, 
digital pagers, Internet browsing, and electronic mail.18 Yet, the earliest 
  
 10 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174-75 (1977). Providers of electronic or 
wire communication services may continue to use pen registers in the ordinary course of business as 
a result of an exception codified in the Pen/Trap Statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (2006). 
 11 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 177-78 (acknowledging congressional intent to treat the 
pen register as a permissible law enforcement tool); see also 86 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 198, No. 03-
406 at *2 (Dec. 18, 2003) (“The placement of pen registers and trap and trace devices allows law 
enforcement officers to obtain such information as the names of suspects in an investigation, the 
identities and relationship between individuals suspected of engaging in criminal activity, especially 
in conspiracies, and the location of fugitives.”). 
 12 Pen registers are approved on an individual basis by courts pursuant to ex parte 
requests by law enforcement agents. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a). The Pen/Trap Statute imposes an 
obligation on the Attorney General to report to Congress each year the total number of pen registers 
for which agents of the DOJ applied. 18 U.S.C. § 3126. However, these reports are not publicly 
available and other authors have been unable to obtain them despite thorough efforts. See, e.g., 
Robert Ditzion, Electronic Surveillance in The Internet Age: The Strange Case of Pen Registers, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1321, 1347 n.162 (2004). Most evidence of the total number of pen register 
applications granted appears to be anecdotal. See Giardi, infra note 13, at 554; see also Carl S. 
Kaplan, Concern Over Proposed Changes in Internet Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/technology/21CYBERLAW.html/?ex=1236315 
600&en=c0400d2e20c62f91&ei=5070 (quoting former DOJ trial attorney who claimed to use pen 
registers to obtain non-content “hundreds of times”) (on file with author). 
 13 Albert Giardi, Jr., Companies Caught in the Middle, Keynote Address, 41 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 535, 554 (2007). 
 14 Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital 
Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 982-86 (1996) (discussing the evolution of the pen register). 
 15 See infra Part I.B. 
 16 See infra Part I.C. 
 17 See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 982-86. 
 18 See infra Part I.C; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘pen register’ 
means a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication 
is transmitted . . . .”). 
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devices that Congress and courts considered to be pen registers lacked 
this wide scope of functions. 
The primitive pen register of the 1960s attached to a telephone 
line and then generated a paper tape on which it printed dashes that 
correlated to the outgoing numbers the user dialed.19 Because at that time 
telephone users only used telephones to place phone calls, many believed 
that any device that detected the digits dialed to connect a call could not 
reveal the substantive information the user communicated during the 
call.20 Understandably, laws and attitudes failed to anticipate how the 
nature and use of communication devices, including telephones, would 
evolve and expand in the decades to follow.21 
Today, telephones serve many purposes aside from facilitating 
conversation.22 Similarly, a proliferation of digital devices with complex 
and innovative capabilities can monitor far more about a single telephone 
call than merely the digits the user dialed. Devices can easily capture the 
“time, date, and duration” of calls.23 In the case of a cellular telephone 
user, a pen register can supply information that can be used to calculate 
the user’s physical location or track the user’s movements in real time.24 
Litigation has tested the outer boundaries of what devices are properly 
considered to be pen registers. For instance, plaintiffs have challenged 
the use by law enforcement agencies of pen registers to clone a suspect’s 
pager,25 track a suspect’s web site activity,26 or monitor the flow of e-mail 
traffic into and away from a particular e-mail account.27 In resolving 
plaintiffs’ claims, courts have crafted their views of which devices may 
qualify as pen registers in light of the statutory text. One court, for 
instance, speculated that a device that allowed its operator to eavesdrop 
on actual telephone conversations could fall within the statutory 
definition of a pen register, so long as the eavesdropping function was 
  
 19 See, e.g., United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. 
Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
 20 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977). 
 21 See In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap 
and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d, 
325 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose 
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no 
protection against such invasions of individual security?”).  
 22 For instance, the Apple i-Phone allows its user to browse the Internet, e-mail, 
download music, and utilize maps with GPS tracking, in addition to other features. See Apple- 
iPhone-Features, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 23 Freiwald, supra note 14, at 986. 
 24 The use of pen registers to track telephone users in real time is also controversial. See, 
e.g., Timothy Stapleton, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell Location Data: 
Is the Whole More than the Sum of its Parts?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007) (recommending 
that the Pen/Trap Statute be amended to prevent the use of a pen register to collect cell site data 
without a showing of probable cause). 
 25 Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 26 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 27 Warshak v.United States., 532 F.3d 521, 524 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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inactive.28 Another court concluded that a device that monitored the URL 
addresses that the defendant visited, as well as the e-mail addresses of 
those to whom he sent messages, was a pen register.29 Recently, another 
court concluded that a device that collected content was statutorily 
precluded from being a pen register, even if the government stipulated 
that it would only decode pre-cut-through dialed digits.30 
In short, the classification of a device as a pen register is 
primarily functional, but not exclusively so. The analysis depends not 
only on the capabilities of a specific device in light of the statutory 
definition of a pen register, but also turns on the philosophy of the 
particular court applying that language to a particular device. 
Accordingly, both Congress and the courts play significant roles in 
determining whether a device is a pen register.31 Parts I.B and I.C explore 
those roles, respectively. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Content, Non-Content, and 
Pen Registers 
The current statutory definition of a pen register provides that the 
information that a pen register records or decodes “shall not include the 
contents of any communication.”32 The term “contents”33 is a legal term 
of art with a meaning developed over time through both case law and 
legislation. In simplistic terms, the content of a particular electronic 
communication includes the substantive aspects of that communication, 
as distinguished from those attributes of the communication that relate 
exclusively to its facilitation.34 The digits dialed to connect a telephone 
call, the delivery address written on the outside of a mailed envelope,35 or 
the email address of the user to whom an email is sent36 all exemplify 
attributes that facilitate a communication, but which ordinarily do not 
reveal the substantive content of the communication. 
  
 28 People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 737 (N.Y. 1998) (concluding that if a device’s 
digital and audio functions were “sufficiently discrete” and there was a “remote” likelihood of 
misuse, the presence of audio-capable technology would not disqualify the device from use as a pen 
register). 
 29 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 504. 
 30 In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and 
Trace Device on Wireless Tele. Bearing Tele. No. [Redacted], Subscribed to [Redacted], Serviced 
By [Redacted] (E.D.N.Y. III), No. 08 MC 0595, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101364, at *8-*9 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 15, 2008). 
 31 See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 985-86. 
 32 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). 
 33 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006). 
 34 Susan Freiwald usefully distinguishes between communication content and 
communication attributes. See Freiwald, supra note 14, at 953 (“[A]ttributes [of a communication] 
include the existence, duration and . . . the identities of the parties to it, their physical locations and 
their electronic addresses.”). 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 36 See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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This understanding of content can be traced back to 1967, when 
the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States37 that the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement applied to the substantive 
aspects of a telephone communication if the speaker’s expectation of 
privacy in his conversation was reasonable.38 The Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”39 In Katz, the Court considered whether the 
government had conducted an unreasonable search by electronically 
intercepting the dialogue of a telephone call that the defendant placed on 
a public telephone from within a telephone booth.40 The Court of Appeals 
had concluded that the government’s action was not a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes because the government had not physically entered 
the telephone booth in order to intercept the communication.41 The 
Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, explaining that the Fourth 
Amendment protects “people—and not simply ‘areas’ against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”42 The Court concluded that to apply 
the Fourth Amendment more narrowly would be to “ignore the vital 
role” of the telephone in modern life.43 
The concurring opinion by Justice Harlan fashioned a two-
pronged test to determine whether a search was unreasonable.44 Courts 
later adopted this test as the standard for determining the legality of a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.45 Under this articulation, the Fourth 
Amendment protects parties who have either an objectively legitimate 
expectation of privacy, or a subjective expectation of privacy that 
“society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”46 Applying this test to 
the defendant’s conversation in the telephone booth, Justice Harlan 
concluded that the defendant had a legitimate expectation that what he 
said to the other party during the call was private.47 Since his expectation 
of privacy was reasonable, the interception of the defendant’s 
  
 37 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 38 Id. at 353-54. 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 40 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-50.  
 41 Id. at 348-49. This reasoning followed from early Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (concluding that warrantless wiretapping 
was not a search under the Fourth Amendment unless the defendant’s physical property had been 
invaded). 
 42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  
 43 Id. at 352. 
 44 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 45 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); see also Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (concluding that the use of thermal imagery to measure heat 
emanating from within a private home constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (concluding that the warrantless 
observation of a private backyard did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 46 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted).  
 47 See id. 
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communication constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment.48 
Congress responded to the Katz decision the following year by 
enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968,49 which provided statutory protection for the “content”50 of 
communications.51 Part I.C discusses this legislation in greater detail. In 
short, Title III, commonly known as the “Wiretap Act,” set forth 
procedures for obtaining authorization to intercept a wire or oral 
communication.52 Under Title III, after a government agent demonstrates 
probable cause in a federal court, the court may issue a warrant 
authorizing the government to intercept the content of a private 
communication falling under Title III.53 Title III incorporated the basic 
principle of Katz by defining content, “with respect to any wire, oral or 
electronic communication, [as] includ[ing] any information concerning 
the substance, purport or meaning of that communication.”54 
In 1977, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., the Court 
first considered the relationship between pen registers and the “content” 
protected by Title III.55 New York Telephone Company had resisted a 
directive from the FBI to install pen registers on two telephone lines the 
defendants used in an illegal gambling enterprise.56 Although the 
government possessed probable cause to believe that the defendants used 
the telephone lines illegally,57 the telephone company argued that the 
district court could only order it to furnish facilities and technical 
assistance to the government in connection with a wiretap order 
conforming to Title III.58 The Court rejected this argument and concluded 
that pen registers were not governed by Title III because they were 
incapable of “intercept[ing]” the content of wire or oral 
communications.59 Relying on the prevalent understanding at the time, 
the Court concluded that digits dialed into a telephone lacked the 
capacity to be substantive. Consequently, it followed that pen registers 
posed a lesser threat to privacy than traditional wiretaps because they 
  
 48 See id. 
 49 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).  
 50  Id. § 2510(8) (defining “content”). 
 51 Id. § 2511 (prohibiting the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications).  
 52 See id. §§ 2510-2522.  
 53 Id. § 2518(1)(a)-(f), (3). 
 54 Id. § 2510(8). 
 55 See 434 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1977). 
 56 Id. at 162. 
 57 Id. 161-62. 
 58 Id. at 162-63.  
 59 Title III defines “intercept” as the “aural or other acquisition” of content. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(4). Because a pen register does not monitor sound, the court concluded that a pen register 
cannot “intercept” content. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 166-67. 
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could not reveal substantive information about a telephone 
communication.60 
In New York Telephone, the government possessed probable 
cause to believe that the defendants used telephone lines illegally.61 
Consequently, the Court had no occasion to rule on the minimal showing 
of suspicion needed to justify the use of a pen register.62 However, the 
Court answered that open question in 1979 in the case of Smith v. 
Maryland.63 The defendant, Smith, appealed his robbery conviction on 
the grounds that the government’s investigation included the installation 
and use of a pen register to monitor his telephone use without a warrant.64 
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun affirmed the decision by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland,65 and held that Fourth Amendment 
protections do not apply to dialed digits.66 To reach this conclusion, the 
Court applied the Katz test and concluded that a telephone user does not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in dialed numbers because the 
user is aware that the telephone company monitors the numbers dialed to 
connect a telephone call.67 This holding reflected a basic tenet of the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: an individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information that the individual 
voluntarily turns over or conveys68 to a third party.69 In revealing 
information to a third party, even on the assumption that it will be kept 
secret, one assumes the risk that that party may reveal that information to 
the government.70 
The Court identified several ways in which a telephone 
subscriber receives notice that a telephone company has facilities that 
enable it to document its subscribers’ dialing activities.71 The Court 
  
 60 See id. at 168. 
 61 Id. at 162. 
 62 See id. at 165 n.7. 
 63 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 64 Id. at 737. 
 65 Smith v. Maryland, 389 A.2d 858 (1978). 
 66 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id.  
 69 Id. at 743-44. Professor Orin S. Kerr refers to this principle as “the disclosure 
principle.” Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that 
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 628 (2003); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 561 (2009) (defending “the controversial rule that information 
loses Fourth Amendment protection when it is knowingly revealed to a third party”). The disclosure 
principle has guided judicial decision making in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (bank depositor’s records, including checks and deposit slips); 
United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979) (address information on outside of mailed 
envelope); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1989) (interception of content of 
telephone conversation on portable phone by radio in the vicinity). 
 70 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442); see also United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (discussing the disclosure principle in connection with the 
seizure and search by federal agents of packages determined to contain cocaine). 
 71 A telephone user realizes that by dialing digits, those digits are conveyed to the 
telephone company in order to complete the call. The user also receives a monthly itemized bill that 
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emphasized that its conclusion did not rely on whether the telephone 
company in fact monitored any dialed digits, but rather rested on the 
petitioner’s knowledge that such a possibility existed.72 Because a 
telephone user has notice of the possibility of monitoring, the use of a 
telephone constitutes an assumption of risk by the user that digits dialed 
will not be secret from the telephone company, which might in turn 
reveal those numbers to the government.73 Even if an individual 
telephone user subjectively believed that dialed digits were private, that 
belief would be unreasonable and, under Katz, not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.74 Thus, the Court held that “[t]he installation and use 
of a pen register . . . was not a search, and no warrant was required.”75 
Smith marked the last time that the Supreme Court considered 
the use of pen registers. Therefore, Smith’s holding—that the use of a 
pen register does not constitute a search and therefore does not require 
probable cause—remains relevant to that area of law today.76 However, 
as the next subsection addresses, Congress has acted on several 
occasions since Smith to craft and amend federal law in order to keep 
pace with evolving technology and the specific questions raised by the 
continued exception of pen registers from Title III’s warrant requirement. 
C.  The Evolution of the Pen/Trap Statute 
The statutory scheme that regulates the use of pen registers can 
best be understood by examining in chronological order four public laws, 
including Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (“Title III”),77 the Electronic Communications Protection Act of 
1986 (“ECPA”),78 the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994 (“CALEA”),79 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,80 each 
  
lists numbers dialed. Most telephone books also notify telephone users that the telephone company 
may monitor dialing activity to identify users that make improper phone calls, or to regulate or 
maintain the telephone line. Thus, a telephone user is on notice of the company’s ability to monitor 
dialed digits. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43. Today, these uses are statutorily preserved by an exception 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b) (2006). 
 72 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. 
 73 Id. at 743. 
 74 Id. at 743-44. The court noted, however, that its conclusions applied as a result of the 
telephone company’s known practices, and therefore did not foreclose the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s expectation that the content of his telephone conversation would remain private. See id. 
at 743. 
 75 Id. at 745-46 (quotation marks omitted).  
 76 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering the 
application of Smith to the use of pen registers to record e-mail and Internet activities). 
 77 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)). 
 78 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522, 3121-3127 (2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 79 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 
(2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
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of which directly affected the use of pen registers. This Note takes the 
view that legislative history, particularly statements in committee reports 
or made by a bill’s sponsor, is relevant to courts that must apply a statute 
that, by its plain language, is ambiguous.81 The extent to which this sort 
of evidence should influence judicial decision making is often challenged 
by textualists, who take the view that the “text is the law.”82 
Nevertheless, relevant examples of legislative history are interwoven 
with the history that this Part presents. 
The evolution of the statutory scheme that regulates electronic 
surveillance, including the use of pen registers, has been fueled by 
Congress’ consistent desire to keep pace with the challenges posed by 
emerging technologies to traditional notions of privacy.83 By enacting 
Title III in 1968, Congress took a major step forward in its effort to 
protect electronic communications.84 The purpose of that bill was to 
become “the primary law protecting the security and privacy of business 
and personal communications.”85 However, Title III only provided 
protection for “oral” or “wire” communications that could “be overheard 
and understood by the human ear,”86 and which were transmitted over 
“common carriers.”87 
This changed in 1986 with the passage of the Electronic 
Communications Protection Act.88 The ECPA amended Title III to 
extend its protections to new forms of electronic communications.89 
Members of Congress had become aware of dramatic technological 
changes that created new risks to the privacy and security of transmitted 
communications.90 The ECPA sought to prevent unauthorized 
interceptions of many different electronic communications in the same 
  
 80 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
 81 See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-96 (1989) (incorporating Senate and 
House Committee reports to interpret an ambiguous provision of law). 
 82 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
22-25 (1997) (presenting “textualist” philosophy of legal interpretation); see also Blanchard, 489 
U.S. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision to incorporate Senate 
and House Committee reports to interpret an ambiguous provision of law). 
 83 As one court noted, this “history reflects persistent Congressional efforts to assure that 
communications contents retain their protected legal status in the face of changing technology and 
law enforcement capabilities.” S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 826.  
 84 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).  
 85 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556; see 
also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972). 
 86 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556; see also 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510(1)-(2), 2511. 
 87 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556. 
 88 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522, 3121-3127 (2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 89 Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 90 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556 (discussing 
new forms of technology); see also Brown, 50 F.3d at 289 (reviewing the legislative history of the 
passage of the ECPA). 
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way that Title III had done for oral and wire communications.91 The 
ECPA defined an “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.”92 This broad definition brought modern technologies, such 
as the Internet and e-mail, under Title III’s purview. Consequently, law 
enforcement agencies had to follow Title III’s procedures, including a 
showing of probable cause,93 in order to intercept the content of any 
electronic communication. 
The ECPA also articulated federal guidelines for the installation 
and use of pen registers.94 In 1986, Congress viewed a pen register as a 
device that, in its limited capacity, could only record the telephone 
numbers to which a telephone user placed calls, yet could not capture 
any part of an actual telephone conversation.95 Consequently, the ECPA 
established separate96 and lower97 standards for the installation and use of 
pen registers than those that applied to content-intercepting devices 
under Title III. The distinct sections of the ECPA that regulate pen 
registers and trap-and-trace devices are referred to as the Pen/Trap 
Statute.98 
The standards that govern the installation and use of a pen 
register under the Pen/Trap Statute differ from those that govern content-
intercepting devices under Title III in four ways that are relevant to this 
discussion generally, as well as to the statutory amendments that Part III 
of this Note suggests.  
First, Title III applications must satisfy a higher standard of 
proof than pen register applications.99 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, a judge 
may only issue a wiretap warrant under Title III if the judge determines 
on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that there is probable 
cause to believe that “an individual is committing, has committed, or is 
  
 91 Brown, 50 F.3d at 289. 
 92 18 U.S.C § 2510(12) (2006). 
 93 See id. § 2518(1)(d), (3). 
 94 See id. §§ 3121-3127 (2006). 
 95 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3564. 
 96 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(h)(i) (providing that the use of pen registers is not regulated 
by Title III).  
 97 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 98 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. The name “Pen/Trap Statute” derives from its dual 
application to both pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 2, at 
117. 
 99 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (requiring extensive disclosure incident to a wiretap 
application including, among other things, full and complete statements of fact about the 
investigation and any alternative procedures employed to obtain the desired information without a 
wiretap), with id. § 3122(b) (requiring minimal disclosure incident to a pen register application, 
limited to the identity of the applicant and the agency conducting the investigation and a certification 
that the information sought is relevant to the investigation being conducted). 
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about to commit” a qualified offense.100 In contrast, a pen register 
application requires only that an attorney for the government certify to 
the court in writing and under oath that “the information likely to be 
obtained [by a pen register] is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation being conducted” by the official’s agency.101 The lower 
standard of proof required for pen register applications is “far from 
burdensome.”102 
Second, if an attorney for the government or a law enforcement 
official has made the proper certification to the court, then the court is 
compelled to order the installation and use of a pen register.103 This 
compulsory order leaves no room for judicial discretion in determining 
whether or not a pen register should be issued. A wiretap application, in 
contrast, is permissive. A federal judge has wide latitude for factual 
review in determining whether the particular facts support authorizing 
the interception of content.104  
Third, the Pen/Trap Statute does not contain an exclusion 
requirement. As a result of this omission, evidence obtained pursuant to 
the wrongful or unlawful installation or use of a pen register may be 
admitted as evidence in a criminal case.105 The statute penalizes a 
knowing wrongdoer by authorizing the imposition by the court of either 
a fine or prison sentence, yet it has no effect on the fruit of such 
wrongdoing.106 This stands in contrast to the treatment of content 
wrongfully intercepted pursuant to Title III, which may be suppressed 
upon a petitioner’s motion.107 
  
 100 Id. § 2518(3)(a). 
 101 Id. § 3122(b). 
 102 In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
329 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of 
the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 48 (2004); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in 
Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1566-67 (2004) (discussing the low standard of proof for a pen 
register application). 
 103 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1)-(2); see also S. REP. No. 99-541, at 47 (1986), as reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3601 (“[Section 3123(a)] does not envision an independent judicial review 
of whether the application meets the relevance standard, rather the court needs only to review the 
completeness of the certification submitted.”); 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The court is required to issue an order upon seeing the 
prosecutor’s certification. The court is not authorized to look behind the certification to evaluate the 
judgment of the prosecutor.”). 
 104 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (providing that upon a satisfactory Title III application, a judge 
may enter a wiretap order) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 110 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (discussing the circumstances under which a federal judge may authorize a wiretap order). 
 105 See, e.g., United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995); see also 
United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant 
could not show that Congress intended, either explicitly or implicitly, to provide suppression as a 
remedy for violation of the Pen/Trap Statute). 
 106 18 U.S.C. § 3121(d). 
 107 See id. § 2518(10)(a) (providing aggrieved party the right to move to suppress the 
fruits gathered pursuant to wiretap authorization that was unlawful due to either procedural or 
substantive misuse). 
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Fourth, Title III contains a minimization requirement.108 Under 
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), even where the government intercepts 
communications pursuant to a valid wiretap order, it must “minimize the 
interception” of irrelevant communications.109 Courts view this provision 
as requiring agents to take reasonable steps to avoid recording the 
content of communications that are not relevant to their investigations.110 
At the time of the ECPA’s passage, however, no such provision was 
incorporated into the Pen/Trap Statute.111 This omission may have been 
sensible given the fact that in 1986, neither courts nor Congress 
anticipated that the collection of dialed digits by a pen register could 
reveal more than the telephone number of the party to whom a call had 
been directed, which, under Smith, was not protected information.112 
By 1994, however, this view had changed markedly. That year, 
Congress passed CALEA113 in response to new challenges faced by law 
enforcement as a result of the “explosive growth” of wireless services 
and technologies, such as call forwarding, that had started to impede the 
government’s traditional wiretapping abilities.114 CALEA required the 
telecommunications network providers to develop the capacity to self-
monitor their networks in order to expedite compliance with wiretap, pen 
register, or other court orders for electronic information.115 While 
expanding government access to electronic information, Congress also 
struggled to protect the reasonable expectation of privacy the law 
accorded to the content of electronic communications.116 
Section 207 of CALEA enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c). Entitled 
“Limitation,” this section amended the Pen/Trap Statute by imposing a 
minimization requirement on the use of pen registers.117 Under the 
limitation, any agency authorized to install a pen register “shall use 
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or 
  
 108 See id. § 2518(5). 
 109 Id. 
 110 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). 
 111 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.  
 112 S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2006); see also supra notes 75-76 and 
accompanying text. 
 113 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 
(2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 114 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 9, 12 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 
3489, 3492; see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (summarizing 
purposes of CALEA, including impediments posed to law enforcement by advanced technologies). 
 115 See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 9-10, as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3489-90. 
 116 Id. at 13 as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3493 (“[CALEA] seeks to balance three 
key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out 
properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and 
personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new 
communications services and technologies.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4)(A) (2006) 
(emphasizing the importance of monitoring telecommunications networks “in a manner that protects 
. . . the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be 
intercepted”). 
 117  Pub. L. No. § 207, 108 Stat. 4292 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) 
(2006)). 
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decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, 
addressing, and signaling information utilized in the processing and 
transmitting of wire or electronic communications.”118 This new language 
reflected an emerging awareness of the fact that the digits a pen register 
collected could include content.119 
Divining the exact purpose behind the addition of the limitation, 
however, is no simple task.120 Statements of purpose in the House 
Report121 and statements by the bill’s sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy,122 
indicate that Congress intended the limitation to protect the exercise of 
the government’s surveillance authority and may have contemplated 
allowing the government to collect PCTDDs that included content, so 
long as it endeavored to minimize content by using reasonably available 
technology.123 On the other hand, statements of purpose124 and statements 
  
 118 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006). 
 119 During hearings in March, 1994, Senator Leahy and then FBI Director Louis Freeh 
discussed the fact that some PCTDDs contained content: 
Sen. LEAHY: You say this proposal would not expand law enforcement’s authority to 
collect data on people, and yet if new technologies are used where we can dial up 
everything from a video movie to doing our banking over the phone, you are going to 
have access to a lot more data, just because the phone is being used. 
Mr. FREEH: I do not want that access, and I am willing to concede that. What I want with 
respect to pen registers is the dialing information: telephone numbers which are being 
called, which I have now under pen register authority. As to the banking accounts and 
what movies somebody is ordering at Blockbuster, I do not want it, do not need it, and I 
am willing to have technological blocks with respect to that information, which I can get 
with subpoenas or another process. I do not want that in terms of my access, and that is 
not the transactional data that I need. 
Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecommunications Technologies and 
Services: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. 50 (1994) (statements of Sen. Leahy and Louis J. Freeh, Director, Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation) [hereinafter Freeh Statement]. 
 120 See infra Part II.C. 
 121 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 17, as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3497 (“[T]he bill 
. . . [e]xpressly provides that the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices cannot be used 
to obtain tracking or location information, other than that which can be determined from the phone 
number . . . . Further, the bill requires law enforcement to use reasonably available technology to 
minimize information obtained through pen registers.”) (emphasis added). 
 122 140 CONG. REC. S11,055, S11,055-56, S11,059 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1994) (“[The 
limitation requires that a] government agency authorized to install and use a pen register under this 
chapter or under State law, shall use technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording 
or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and signaling information utilized in call 
processing.”); In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
333 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citation omitted). 
 123 See E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting comments by Sen. 
Leahy in support of both interpretations of the 1994 amendments). 
 124 See S. REP. No. 103-402, at 10 (1994) (“The bill further protects privacy by requiring 
telecommunications systems to protect communications not authorized to be intercepted and by 
restricting the ability of law enforcement to use pen register devices for tracking purposes or for 
obtaining transactional information.”). 
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by Senator Leahy125 in the Senate Report indicate that Congress intended 
the limitation to restrict the government’s access to transactional 
information, but are not amenable to an interpretation that views 
minimization favorably. 
As Congress prepared to pass the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
seven years later, Senator Leahy made several statements that appeared 
to support the view that he believed that Congress intended the limitation 
to prevent the collection of content.126 That year, Congress considered 
two proposed amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute, each of which 
prohibited the use of a pen register to collect content.127 To illuminate the 
necessity of the proposed amendments, Senator Leahy explained that 
although he had added the 1994 limitation after he “recognized that [pen 
registers] collected content and that such collection was unconstitutional 
on the mere relevance standard,”128 information obtained from the F.B.I. 
in June 2000 indicated that the limitation had not deterred law 
enforcement officials from collecting content with pen registers.129 The 
limitation did not have the effect of prohibiting the collection of content 
since, as the government argued, no technology was reasonably available 
that would allow it to distinguish PCTDDs that contained content from 
those that did not.130 Because it did not interpret the limitation’s 
prohibition to be absolute, the government had continued to collect 
content with pen registers in the same way that it had done for years.131 
In this context, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act, which, 
pursuant to § 216, amended two sections of the Pen/Trap Statute.132 First, 
§ 216(a) amended 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)—the 1994 limitation—to prohibit 
the collection of content pursuant to the installation and use of a pen 
register. As a result, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) read and continues to 
read: 
A government agency authorized to install and use a pen register or trap and 
trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use technology 
reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of electronic 
  
 125 See 140 CONG. REC. at S11,056 (statements of Sen. Leahy); 140 CONG. REC. S14,732, 
S14,732 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statements of Sen. Leahy in support of Edwards-Leahy Digital 
Telephony bill). 
 126 See 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statements of Sen. 
Leahy). But see infra Part II.C. 
 127 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 288, 290 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c), 3127(3)-(4) (2006)). 
 128 147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statements of Sen. Leahy). 
 129 Id. (“[T]he FBI advised me in June 2000, that pen register devices for telephone 
services ‘continue to operate as they have for decades’ and that ‘there has been no change . . . that 
would better restrict the recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to the dialing and 
signaling information utilized in call processing.’” (quoting FBI’s explanation to Senator Leahy)). 
 130 See id. For a summary of this same history, see Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The 
Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1198 (2004). 
 131 147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statements of Sen. Leahy). 
 132 See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 288, 290 (2001) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c), 3127(3)-(4)(2006)).  
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or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information 
utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic 
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic 
communications.133 
Section 216(c)(2) also modified 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), which 
contains the statutory definition of a pen register.134 Specifically, 
Congress defined a pen register, for the first time, as a device that cannot 
collect content. The definition read and continues to read: 
[T]he term “pen register” means a device or process which records or decodes 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an 
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is 
transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the 
contents of any communication . . . .135 
From this history, it is evident that when the 2001 amendments 
to the Pen/Trap Statute took effect, Congress was aware that PCTDDs 
could contain content. Further, Congress recognized that the government 
had interpreted the limitation that CALEA imposed in 1994 to authorize 
the collection of all PCTDDs in the absence of reasonably available 
technology to sort content from non-content. While amending the 
Pen/Trap Statute to include new prohibitions on content collection, 
Congress did not eliminate the “reasonably available technology” clause, 
which formed the basis of the government’s claimed authority to collect 
all PCTDDs. These observations are relevant to the analysis of the 
Pen/Trap Statute that courts have performed, which is discussed in 
Part II. 
II.  INTERPRETING THE PEN/TRAP STATUTE 
Until 2006, no court directly addressed the question of whether 
the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes law enforcement agencies to collect 
PCTDDs that contain content.136 Between 2006 and 2008, six courts137 
issued written orders that justified their decisions to deny the portion of a 
law enforcement agent’s ex parte application that sought to collect all 
  
 133 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006) (emphasis added to reflect the 2001 amendment). 
 134 Id. § 3127(3). 
 135 Id. (emphasis added to reflect the 2001 amendment). The definition continues, “such 
term does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic 
communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications 
services provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire 
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its 
business.” Id. The PATRIOT Act also amended 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4), which defines trap and trace 
devices, to provide that a trap and trace device shall not collect the content of a communication. 
PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3). 
 136 During this time, two courts referenced the PCTDD question in dicta. See U.S. 
Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 277 F. 3d 450, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also In Re United States for an 
Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap on [xxx] Internet Service Account/User Name 
[xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 137 See supra note 8. 
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dialed digits from a telephone pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute.138 Given 
the ex parte nature of each proceeding, the courts solicited amicus briefs 
to represent the interests of the telephone user. The six decisions reached 
inconsistent conclusions about whether the Pen/Trap Statute is 
ambiguous, whether canons of statutory interpretation are relevant to the 
question and, if so, how they apply, whether legislative history helps to 
answer the question, and whether the Fourth Amendment protects 
PCTDDs that contain content. 
This Part approaches each question in turn. After identifying the 
different ways that the statute can be interpreted, Part II.A concludes that 
the plain language of the Pen/Trap Statute does not overwhelmingly lend 
support to any particular textual interpretation. As a result of this 
ambiguity, Part II.B applies traditional canons of statutory interpretation 
to the different interpretations of the Pen/Trap Statute. Although the 
canons lend support to the position that the Pen/Trap Statute does not 
authorize the collection of content, they ultimately fail to be entirely 
persuasive. Part II.C concludes that the legislative history of the 
Pen/Trap Statute is also not dispositive on the question of whether the 
statute authorizes the collection of minimal PCTDD content. However, 
Part II.D concludes that because society is prepared to recognize a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in PCTDDs that contain content, the 
canon of constitutional avoidance counsels against an interpretation that 
the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes the collection of content using a pen 
register. 
A.  The Plain Language of the Pen/Trap Statute 
Following the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, the 
opposing parties have argued that the plain language of the Pen/Trap 
Statute mandates a particular conclusion about the legality of collecting 
PCTDDs that contain content with a pen register.139 Consequently, three 
primary interpretations of the text have arisen, each of which 
fundamentally conflicts with the others. The role of the court in such 
circumstances is to determine whether the statute’s plain language 
supports one of the interpretations.140 This Part briefly summarizes the 
  
 138 That no court addressed this issue until five years after the passage of the PATRIOT 
Act may be partially attributed to the fact that pen register applications are ex parte proceedings that 
do not usually result in the publication of a written decision. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006). Further, 
because the court is not entitled to receive facts concerning the investigation beyond the 
investigator’s stipulation that the information sought to be collected is relevant, 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) 
(2006), little has been documented about the number of pen register applications made and granted 
each year, or about the reasons that a particular court granted or denied an application. See, e.g., 
Ditzion, supra note 12, and accompanying text; see also Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: 
The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 589-90 (2007). 
 139 See e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 
167, 174 (2001). 
 140 See e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). 
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three perspectives in order to illustrate that the Pen/Trap Statute is 
ambiguous. Next, Part II.B critiques each perspective using traditional 
canons of statutory interpretation. 
1. The Government’s Theory 
The government has argued that the Pen/Trap Statute’s text 
authorizes the collection of PCTDDs that contain content.141 The 
government’s briefs express this theory in two assertions. First, the 
limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) requires that if technology that can 
distinguish between content and non-content is reasonably available, 
then the government must use that technology to avoid collecting 
content.142 However, if technology that can screen content from non-
content is not reasonably available, then the limitation permits the pen 
register to access content incident to its collection of non-content.143 
Accordingly, the government views the limitation as an exception144 to 
the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) that provides that a pen register shall 
not collect the content of any communication.145 
2. The “Added Precaution” Theory  
A contrary perspective adopted by some courts is that the 
limitation does not operate as an exception to the general prohibition on 
collecting content, but rather precludes the collection of all PCTDDs 
where the collection of content cannot be prevented.146 This theory can 
also be reduced to two assertions. First, if technology that is reasonably 
available to minimize the collection of content exists, then the 
  
 141 The government articulated this interpretation in 2002, shortly after the PATRIOT Act 
went into effect. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., to Ass’t U.S. 
Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., et al., Avoiding Collection and Investigative Use of “Content” in the 
Operation of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 3-4 (May 24, 2002) [hereinafter Thompson 
Memo]. This interpretation continues to represent the government’s position on the issue. See, e.g., 
Government’s Supp. Memo. of Law Demonstrating that Incidental Access to Post-cut-through 
Dialed Digit Content Under the Pen/Trap Statute Is Constitutional at 1-2, In re United States for 
Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Services and (2) Authorizing 
Release of Subscriber Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Misc. 547, 06 
Misc. 561, 07 Misc. 120), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 541 at *1-*2 [hereinafter Gov’t Brief, 
June ’07]. 
 142 Thompson Memo, supra note 141, at 4 (articulating the DOJ’s position that the 
inadvertent collection of PCTDDs that contain content should be avoided but, where it occurs, the 
agent should not use the content affirmatively); see also Gov’t Brief, June ‘07, supra note 141, at 
*1-*2. 
 143 Gov’t Brief, June ‘07, supra note 141, at *11. 
 144 Id. (“The [limitation] establishes ground rules governing circumstances in which it is 
difficult for the government to know in advance” whether pen register information represents 
content or non-content.). 
 145 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006). 
 146 In re Application of United States for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation and Use of 
a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Consumer Records, and (3) Cell 
Phone Tracking (S.D. Tex. I), 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
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government must use it.147 However, if no technology that is reasonably 
available can separate content from non-content, then the government 
may not collect PCTDDs.148 Under this theory, the limitation is only 
operative when technology that can screen content from non-content is 
reasonably available, in which instance the government must use it. 
Where such technology is not reasonably available, the limitation does 
not otherwise condone the use of a pen register to collect content.149 
Thus, the limitation functions primarily as an “added precaution” to 
prevent content collection.150 
3. The “Preclusive Definition” Theory  
A third perspective adopted by one court is similar to the second. 
Its proponents emphasize that under the definition of a pen register in 18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3), it is unlawful for a pen register to record the content of 
a communication.151 If a device records PCTDDs that contain content, 
then that device is not a pen register.152 Under this theory, the limitation 
provision is not a factor in the analysis of whether in certain 
circumstances a pen register can collect PCTDDs that contain content, 
because as soon as a device collects content, the device is not a pen 
register, and the Pen/Trap Statute is no longer implicated.153 
4. Statutory Ambiguity 
The next subsection demonstrates problems with each of these 
interpretations.154 At this point, it is only necessary to observe that each 
perspective is based on and equally supported by the plain language of 
the Pen/Trap Statute. This illuminates the fundamental flaw of the 
statute: it provides no guidance about the effect of an absence of 
reasonably available technology to effectively filter content from non-
content. A more sensible approach is to view the first three theories 
  
 147 Id. at 825. 
 148 Id. at 825-26. 
 149 Id.; see also United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of an 
Elec. Computerized Data Collection Device Equivalent to a Pen Register and Trap and Trace 
Device, No. 06:06-mj-1130 at 5 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2006) (“In the Court’s view, § 3121(c) operates 
as an additional privacy safeguard, rather than an enabling provision.”). 
 150 In re United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trade Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info. 
(S.D. Tex. II), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77635 at *31-32 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2007) (“The requirement 
to use ‘reasonably available technology’ is a supplement to the Government’s obligation not to 
collect contents with a pen register.”). 
 151 In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and 
Trace Device on Wireless Tele. Bearing Tele. No. [Redacted], Subscribed to [Redacted], Serviced 
By [Redacted] (E.D.N.Y. III), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101364 at *8-*9 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 15, 2008). 
 152 Id. at *8-*9, *11. 
 153 See id. (denying government’s pen register application with no discussion of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3121(c)). 
 154 See infra Part II.B. 
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critically and conclude, as one court has done, that the Pen/Trap Statute 
is ambiguous.155 The language of the statute contradicts itself because the 
definition of a pen register includes an unconditional prohibition of the 
use of a pen register to collect content,156 yet the limitation provision 
appears to require only the use of reasonably available technology to 
prevent the collection of content.157 
B.  Applying Canons of Statutory Interpretation to the Pen/Trap 
Statute 
Canons of statutory interpretation are “rules of thumb” that 
courts apply to aid in statutory interpretation.158 Courts are not bound by 
the result that the application of a particular canon would produce.159 
Further, the individual canons have been criticized for being easily 
countered.160 Nevertheless, courts continue to apply them routinely. 
Because the ambiguity inherent in the Pen/Trap Statute gives rise to 
several possible interpretations of its text, this Part will assess the effect 
of several applicable canons of construction on the three emergent 
interpretations. 
The government’s interpretative theory161 is undesirable because 
it interprets statutory silence as modifying the plain commandment of 18 
U.S.C. § 3127(3) that a pen register shall not collect content.162 To 
subscribe to the government’s view is to conclude that the limitation, 
which is only operative after the government has received authorization 
to use a pen register, alters the scope of what a pen register can do.163 
Yet, the only way to reach the conclusion that the limitation alters the 
definition of a pen register is to rely on Congressional silence, which is 
generally undesirable.164 The statute fails to provide that the lack of 
reasonably available technology to sort content from non-content has any 
effect on the abilities of a pen register. This silence should not be 
interpreted as an implied exception to the clear commandment of 18 
  
 155 In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
332 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). 
 159 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 849 (4th Ed. 2007). 
 160 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
 161  See supra notes 141-145. 
 162 This canon of interpretation may be referred to as the “dog that did not bark.” Chisom 
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dept. of Educ., 
127 S. Ct. 1534, 1541-45 (2007). 
 163 S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 164 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396. 
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U.S.C. § 3127(3), since it can be presumed that if Congress intended 
such an exception, it could easily have provided it explicitly.165 
A second canon of interpretation advises courts to interpret an 
ambiguous statutory provision in a way that is consistent with the whole 
act of which it is a part.166 Under this canon, viewing the limitation as a 
prohibition of the collection of content where sorting technology is not 
reasonably available—the added precaution theory that some courts have 
adopted—is preferable to the government’s theory. Such an 
interpretation has the advantage of maintaining consistency within the 
Pen/Trap Statute, since it does not require inferring from statutory 
silence exceptions to the plain commandment in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).167 
In this way, the interpretation minimizes the conflict between the 
limitation and the definition.  
On the other hand, the precaution theory can be criticized on the 
grounds that adopting it renders the limitation mere surplusage. A 
separate canon of construction guides courts to avoid such a result, 
counseling against interpretations of statutory provisions that strip 
particular words of meaning.168 To conclude, as the precaution theory 
does, that the limitation operates to “supplement”169 the definition of a 
pen register is to say that the limitation merely reiterates, or repeats, what 
is written elsewhere. Yet such repetition is redundant. If a pen register by 
definition cannot collect content, then the limitation is unnecessary to the 
extent that it merely functions to remind courts that a pen register cannot 
collect content. 
Formal logic is a useful way of illustrating the application of the 
canons of interpretation to the government’s theory and the precaution 
theory.170 As noted above, each perspective imposes a “gloss”171 onto the 
interplay between the two statutory provisions. Although the statute is 
not phrased in the form of an if-then conditional, both perspectives 
proceed from the assumption that it can be understood as such.172 For 
instance, both theories concur that under the statute, if technology to sort 
content from non-content is reasonably available, then the government 
must use it to prevent the collection of content (if X, then Y).173 Yet the 
  
 165 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 259-60 (1994). 
 166 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 273-74 (2006). 
 167 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
 168 Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113-14 (2001); see e.g., TRW Inc. v. 
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
 169  See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 170 This method of analysis comes from an amicus brief submitted by the Federal 
Defenders of New York. Supplemental Memorandum of Law by Amici Curiae for Fed. Defenders of 
N.Y., Inc. & Elec. Frontier Found. at 33-34, In re Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers and 
Trap and Trace Services and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d 
325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-Misc.-547, 561), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 540, at *33-*34 
[hereinafter Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07]. 
 171 See S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824-25 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 172 See supra notes 142-143, 147-148 and accompanying text. 
 173 Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *33-*34. 
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two perspectives diverge with respect to the consequences that arise if no 
technology is reasonably available to perform the sorting (not X). The 
government’s theory concludes that if no technology exists, the 
government can collect content (if not X, then not Y). The precaution 
theory concludes that if no technology exists, the government cannot 
collect content (if not X, then Y). Yet both perspectives suffer from a 
logical fallacy. 
By concluding that if not X, then not Y, the government’s 
perspective commits the common logical error of denying the 
antecedent.174 In an if-then conditional such as “if X then Y,” the 
negation of X has no bearing on whether or not Y obtains.175 It follows 
that in the Pen/Trap Statute, even if it is correct to reduce the statute to a 
conditional form, the absence of reasonably available technology (not X) 
does not require any particular result as to whether or not a pen register 
can collect content (maybe Y, but maybe not). 
Similarly, under the precaution approach (if not X, then Y), X is 
stripped of any utility because Y remains constant whether or not the 
condition X is satisfied. Proponents of this theory argue that if 
technology is reasonably available (if X), then no content may be 
collected (then Y). But the same proponents also argue that if technology 
is not reasonably available (if not X), then no content may be collected 
(then Y).176 Because content may not be collected whether or not 
technology is reasonably available, it appears that there is no relationship 
between X and Y. This, in turn, reiterates the conclusion that under the 
precaution theory, the limitation is superfluous. 
The definitional theory conflicts even more clearly with the 
canon against superfluities.177 As noted above, under the definitional 
theory, the limitation does not factor into the analysis of a pen register’s 
ability to collect content.178 As soon as a device collects data that includes 
content, the device is not a pen register. If the device is not a pen register, 
the limitation does not apply. There are no other circumstances in which 
the limitation would apply, because the limitation only applies to pen 
registers that collect data that might include content. Thus, this theory 
essentially writes the limitation out of the statute. 
In sum, applying the canons of interpretation fails to cure the 
ambiguity of the Pen/Trap Statute because each of the three theories 
appears equally prone to criticism. Although one additional canon is 
  
 174 ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: 
SYMBOLIC LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 51 (1997) (“One who gives this argument a superficial 
examination may hold that it exhibits the form modus tollens. Closer inspection, however, will show 
that it is the counterfeit of modus tollens, the invalid pattern called the fallacy of denying the 
antecedent.”); see also Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *33-*34. 
 175 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 174, at 51. 
 176 See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text. 
 177 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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discussed below in Part II.D, before proceeding to that discussion, Part 
II.C briefly examines the legislative history of the statute for additional 
signs of legislative intent. 
C.  The Legislative History of the Pen/Trap Statute 
When confronted with an ambiguous statute, courts often resort 
to legislative history in order to ascertain the effect that Congress 
intended the statute to have.179 The process of using legislative history 
has its critics.180 Nevertheless, courts routinely resort to legislative 
history, despite academic critiques of its utility. Among proponents of 
legislative history, committee reports are generally viewed as the most 
persuasive form of legislative history.181 Statements made by individual 
senators are less persuasive than committee reports,182 however, 
statements made by a bill’s sponsor are typically considered more 
persuasive than the remarks of other Congressmen.183 
As noted previously, the legislative history of CALEA 
concerning the passage of the 1994 amendment that enacted the 
limitation is ambiguous.184 Statements in the Senate and House Reports 
and statements made directly by Senator Leahy185 alternate between 
indicating that the limitation envisioned minimal collection of content, 
and indicating that it did not.186 No clear answer to the question of 
whether Congress intended a pen register to collect PCTDDs that contain 
a minimal amount of content emerges by resorting to legislative history 
from 1994. 
The legislative history related to the passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act in 2001 is equally unhelpful. Unlike the 1994 
amendments, no committee reports address the intended effect of the 
amendments of § 216.187 However, Senator Leahy made remarks bearing 
directly on the intended effect of § 216 on the Pen/Trap Statute.188 
  
 179 See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-57 (1984); see also In re Sinclair, 
870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 180 See SCALIA, supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977). 
 181 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 981; see, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 
87, 91-96 (1989); United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585-86 (1957). 
 182 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 1020. 
 183 Id. at 1000 (suggesting that the “statements by sponsors are given such deference in 
part because the sponsors are the most knowledgeable legislators about the proposed bill and in part 
because their representations about the purposes and effects of the proposal are relied upon by other 
legislators”). 
 184 See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text. 
 185 Senate Report 103-402 accompanied the Digital Telephony Bill of 1994. S. REP. No. 
103-402, at 10 (1994). No senate report was submitted with CALEA. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 1 
(1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489. 
 186 See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text. 
 187 Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Requests for Authorization to 
Acquire Post-cut-through Dialed Digits Via Pen Registers at 26-27, In re Orders (1) Authorizing Use 
of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Services and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber 
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This legislative history can be viewed in two distinct ways. Both 
ways agree on certain fundamental points. First, it is evident that in 1994, 
members of Congress recognized that pen registers could collect 
content,189 and that in 2001, members of Congress recognized that pen 
registers routinely did collect content.190 Second, it is evident that in 
2001, members of Congress recognized that the government based its 
authority to collect PCTDDs that contained content on its interpretation 
of the 1994 limitation embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c).191 Third, it is 
evident that with these first two factors in mind, Congress enacted 
legislation that amended three provisions of the Pen/Trap Statute, 
including the limitation itself, with language that prohibited the use of a 
pen register to collect content.192 
With this in mind, it is possible to view the Pen/Trap Statute 
from an “aerial” perspective. The evolution of the statute over time—
from its inception in 1986 to the 1994 and 2001 amendments—is 
consistent with a desire by Congress to protect the content of electronic 
communications despite the advent of new technologies that threatened 
that status.193 When Congress realized in 1994 that pen registers could 
collect content, it enacted the limitation. When Congress realized that the 
limitation did not prevent the collection of content in practice, it enacted 
three additional provisions intended to prohibit the collection of 
content.194 From this history, it is possible to conclude as a general matter 
that the three amendments point towards a singular conclusion, namely 
that, “interception of any communications content is not authorized, and 
technology must be used to insure that communications content is not 
collected.”195 If viewed in this way, the legislative history supports the 
denial of an application to install and use a pen register to collect all 
digits dialed from a subject telephone.196 
On the other hand, by placing more emphasis on the specific 
circumstances surrounding the 2001 amendments, arguments to the 
contrary emerge. It is apparent that in 2001, Senator Leahy believed that 
the collection of content by a pen register was unconstitutional.197 
However, that Senator Leahy held this belief does not mean that each 
  
Information, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 Misc. 547, No. 6 Misc. 561), 2007 U.S. 
Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 545, at *26-*27 [hereinafter Gov’t Brief, Jan. ‘07]. 
 188 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S10,999 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 189 See e.g., Freeh Statement, supra note 119, and accompanying text. 
 190 147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 191 Id. 
 192 See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text. 
 193 S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 827.  
 196 See In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap 
and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 
325, 333-34 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 197 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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member of Congress shared it. In fact, Senator Leahy’s remarks indicate 
that during the process of reaching consensus on the provisions of the 
bill, he encountered and acquiesced to resistance to his efforts to add 
additional protection for PCTDDs that contain content. Examining the 
compromises made between parties with distinctly different viewpoints 
about a divisive issue is an important way of gauging the effect that 
Congress intended the statute to have. 
For instance, Senator Leahy proposed that the PATRIOT Act 
should include specific definitions for the terms “routing” and 
“addressing” to ensure that courts did not interpret the terms so broadly 
that they included content.198 Yet, the Bush Administration and the 
Department of Justice “flatly rejected” that approach.199 Senator Leahy 
worried that the Administration’s desire to leave the terms undefined 
would fail to protect content.200 But Congress did not decide to include 
definitions in the statute. Instead, Congress and the Administration 
reached a compromise that included amending the definitions of a pen 
register and trap-and-trace device and the limitation to prohibit the 
collection of content. Thus, although Senator Leahy personally believed 
that content collection under the statute should be prohibited, his 
statements indicate that the statute did not follow a path that would have 
unequivocally achieved this effect. It follows that because the 
amendments represented a compromise between Senator Leahy and the 
Administration, they should not be viewed as adopting only Senator 
Leahy’s view and absolutely prohibiting the collection of content.201 
Driven by his concerns about content collection, Senator Leahy 
also sought to update and modify the judicial review procedure for 
obtaining authorization to install and use a pen register by requiring law 
enforcement agents to present details of their investigations to the judges 
who consider their applications. Senator Leahy did not argue that the 
relevance standard should be enhanced, but only that courts should learn 
more information about the underlying investigations.202 Again, Senator 
Leahy met with defeat. The Bush administration refused to capitulate, 
and Senator Leahy acquiesced, but nevertheless appeared satisfied with 
the final result.203 This progression carries two implications. First, it 
  
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 For a discussion that highlights the importance of identifying legislative compromises, 
see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 159, at 67 (“[T]he existence of vetogates may tell statutory 
interpreters . . . to whom they should pay attention if they consult legislative history . . . . Legislative 
statements are most important when they reflect assurances by the enacting coalition—especially 
promises to or by gatekeepers—to enable the bill to pass through a vetogate.”). 
 202 147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 203 Id.; see also id. at S11,015 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“It is not precisely the bill I 
would have written . . . . But it is a good bill. It is a balanced bill. . . . It is one that sets up the checks 
and balances necessary in a democratic society that allow us to protect and preserve our security but 
also protect and preserve our liberties.”). 
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appears that if the statute required more disclosure, then Senator Leahy 
would have been comfortable if courts continued to grant pen register 
applications on the low relevance standard, despite the fact that pen 
registers were known to collect content. Second, the legislation that 
finally passed did not reflect only Senator Leahy’s vision of how the 
statute would operate, but also took into account the perspective of the 
Bush Administration, which viewed the collection of PCTDDs that 
contain content favorably.  
Lastly, Senator Leahy also acknowledged that the FBI had 
reported that it continued to collect content because there had been no 
change in technology that would “better restrict” the information 
collected so as to include only non-content.204 The FBI’s use of the 
phrase “better restrict” indicates that it sought to develop technology that 
would screen content more efficiently, but not completely. Yet despite 
being made aware of the FBI’s perspective, neither Senator Leahy nor 
Congress categorically rejected the possibility that a pen register could 
collect minimal content if technology could “better restrict” that process. 
Nor did Senator Leahy express any intention to modify or eliminate the 
limitation, which was known to be the basis of the government’s claimed 
authority to collect PCTDDs that contain content.205 
In sum, the legislative history of the Pen/Trap Statute is 
amenable to two interpretations. On the macro level, the evolution of the 
Pen/Trap Statute, culminating in the passage of three distinct 
amendments that prohibited the collection of content, supports the 
conclusion that Congress intended to prevent the collection of content by 
a pen register. On the micro level, the legislative history demonstrates 
that the amendments that emerged from the legislative process resulted 
from compromises between those who advocated greater protection for 
content and those who rejected greater protection for content. Thus, 
Congress did not intend the amendments to protect content completely. 
Because this history lends equal support to both outcomes, it cannot be 
dispositive on the question of whether the Pen/Trap Statute authorizes 
the collection of content with a pen register.206 
D.  Applying the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance to the Pen/Trap 
Statute 
A stronger argument in support of the conclusion that the 
Pen/Trap Statute does not authorize the collection of content lies in 
  
 204 Id. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 205 Gov’t Brief, Jan. ‘07, supra note 187, at *31-*32. 
 206 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1994) (refusing to view 
legislative history as dispositive of Congressional intent in the absence of evidence that members of 
Congress believed that they had reached a tacit agreement to a controversial issue). 
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applying the canon of constitutional avoidance.207 This canon has been 
described as “the preeminent canon of federal statutory construction.”208 
It guides courts choosing between competing interpretations of a 
statutory text to choose an interpretation that avoids raising a 
constitutional question.209 To apply the canon, a court need not determine 
that a particular statutory interpretation would undoubtedly conflict with 
the Constitution. Rather, a court must only conclude that the 
interpretation might be unconstitutional, and then avoid it.210 
Congress has historically gone to great lengths to ensure that the 
Fourth Amendment protects the content of electronic communications.211 
Further, the Supreme Court has given no indication that the content of 
electronic communications is entitled to less protection when it is 
conveyed over a telephone in the form of PCTDDs than when it is 
conveyed through other means that require compliance with Title III’s 
procedures. Nevertheless, the government has argued that a telephone 
user cannot maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy after entering 
such digits into an automated telephone system.212 The government 
reaches this result by extending the holding in Smith. Under its view, a 
caller assumes the same risk with respect to PCTDDs as with respect to 
the digits dialed to connect a telephone call because both types of digits 
must be conveyed to the telephone company, which can in turn record all 
of the digits dialed.213 It follows from this interpretation that no dialed 
digits are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.214 
Yet at its outset, Smith acknowledged that its holding did not 
address the government’s ability to capture the content of 
communications.215 Rather, Smith presupposed a context in which a pen 
register intercepted non-content digits voluntarily transmitted to a 
telephone company in order to complete a call, but could not intercept 
content.216 The PCTDD issue today has arisen squarely outside Smith’s 
framework. It exists within a fundamentally different context and 
  
 207 In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
335 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 208 Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1945, 1948 (1997). 
 209 See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-82 (2005); see also Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002). 
 210 Vermeule, supra note 208, at 1958. 
 211 E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 335-36; see also Kerr, supra note 69, at 630-31. 
 212 Brief for Gov’t, In re Orders (1) Authorizing Use of Pen Registers, 515 F. Supp. 2d 
325 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-Misc.-547, 561, 07-Misc.-120), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Br. LEXIS 539, 
at *2. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (“[P]en registers do not acquire the 
contents of communications.”). 
 216 Id. at 741-42. 
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presents constitutional concerns that Smith did not foresee.217 
Consequently, it is doubtful whether Smith’s holding governs the 
interception of content with a pen register at all. It is even more doubtful 
whether extending Smith in order to justify the collection of content 
under the Pen/Trap Statute would be constitutional, for the simple fact 
that Congress has repeatedly recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects the content of electronic communications.218 For these reasons, 
the government’s interpretation should be avoided under the canon of 
constitutional avoidance. 
Even a court that applied Smith to PCTDDs would reach the 
same result. Smith applied the test articulated in Katz, which determines 
whether a particular form of electronic surveillance violates the Fourth 
Amendment.219 Under Katz, the person invoking Fourth Amendment 
protection must demonstrate a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the information sought to be protected.220 This 
inquiry is normally satisfied by demonstrating both that an individual 
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy, and also that the individual’s 
subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.221 
In light of Katz, the government’s argument is unavailing 
because it fails to consider the actual nature of PCTDDs. Both Katz and 
Congress have emphasized that the content of a communication is 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.222 Despite the expectations of 
privacy that people maintain in their bank account numbers, social 
security numbers, or other private information,223 the government’s 
theory associates PCTDDs most closely with digits dialed to connect a 
call. Yet, when they contain substantive, private information, PCTDDs 
actually resemble the content that Katz sought to protect.224 When a 
telephone user enters PCTDDs to navigate an automated answering 
system, the PCTDDs are the equivalent of a conversation with an entity 
  
 217 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). 
 218 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006); see also Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, 
at *27-*28.  
 219 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 220 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). 
 221 Id. But see id. at 740 n.5 (noting that “where an individual’s subjective expectations 
had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those 
subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection was”).  
 222 See supra notes 38, 50-51 and accompanying text. 
 223 In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 
336 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 224 Id. 
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representative that would otherwise be protected.225 Without a wiretap 
order, a pen register cannot lawfully intercept the oral component of 
telephone conversations. Similarly, a pen register should not be able to 
intercept lawfully the functional equivalent of an actual conversation 
simply because it takes the form of a PCTDD.226 To conclude otherwise 
would interfere with telephone users’ legitimate expectation of privacy in 
PCTDDs that contain content. 
Finally, in Smith, the Court rejected the petitioner’s privacy 
claim because it imputed to telephone users, as a class, notice that dialed 
digits may be monitored, which bolstered its conclusion that one who 
dials a telephone assumes a known risk that those digits might be 
provided to the government.227 Yet while the third-party disclosure 
principle supplies grounds for eliminating Fourth Amendment 
protection,228 its application in Smith rests on the assumption that a 
reasonable user will know that he is revealing information in a manner 
that can lead to its interception.229 It is a stretch to say that the telephone 
user assumes the risk that digits dialed into an automated system after 
being connected to the target number will be monitored by the telephone 
company,230 because the telephone user receives inadequate notice that 
such a risk exists.231 For instance, PCTDDs are not listed on monthly bills 
like digits dialed to connect a call.232 Nor would a telephone user have 
  
 225 Michael A. Rosow, Note, Is “Big Brother” Listening? A Critical Analysis of New 
Rules Permitting Law Enforcement Agencies to Use Dialed Digit Extraction, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
1051, 1073 (2000). 
 226 Id. at 1078. PCTDDs can also be analogized to the digits transmitted to pagers. 
E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339. Courts considering the question have held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects digits transmitted to pagers. See, e.g., Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 294 (4th 
Cir. 1995). 
 227 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
 228 See supra note 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 229 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in 
the ordinary course of business.”). 
 230 It is beyond the scope of this Note to evaluate a debate between the Federal Defenders 
of New York and the Government about whether the particular way in which PCTDDs are 
transmitted should factor into the determination of whether the Fourth Amendment protects them. 
Compare Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *5-*6 (distinguishing between the 
transmission of digits over the control channel and content channels), with Gov’t Brief, June ‘07, 
supra note 141, at *9-*10 (minimizing the distinction between the control and content channels). For 
technical information about digital telephony technology, see Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act: Hearing Before the FCC (1999) (statement of Dave Yarbaugh, FBI Supervisory 
Special Agent), available at http://www.askcalea.net/lef/docs/990127-y.pdf; see also 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act: Hearing Before the FCC (1999) (statement of 
John W. Cutright, FBI Electrical Engineer), available at http://www.askcalea.com/lef/docs/990127-
c.pdf.. 
 231 Further, such a risk is not consonant with the expectations of privacy that the 
telephone user would retain if the same information was transmitted by conversation. On the other 
hand, that the Fourth Amendment would not protect digits dialed to connect a telephone call is 
consonant with the fact that automated dialing systems are the functional equivalent of live 
operators, to whom the user willingly revealed the destination telephone number. Smith, 442 U.S. at 
744-45. 
 232 Rosow, supra note 225, at 1078. 
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any reason to expect a continued need for monitoring by the telephone 
company beyond the point of connection to a third party’s line.233 
In Smith, the Court identified multiple ways in which the 
telephone user received notification of the telephone company’s capacity 
to monitor digits dialed to connect calls.234 Because it was reasonable to 
conclude that the telephone user received notice that such practices could 
occur, the Court concluded it was unreasonable to believe that a 
telephone user expected communications to be private.235 Yet the Court 
did not and has never held that a telephone user assumes the risk that 
communications may be revealed solely because the telephone company 
possesses the capacity or occasionally chooses to monitor electronic 
transmissions. Notice to the user—at least sufficient to impute 
knowledge—is also a necessary element of the assumption of risk 
argument. To conclude otherwise would achieve the result that Smith 
rejected by conditioning Fourth Amendment protection on the particular 
industry practices of the service provider, without regard for a reasonable 
user’s actual or imputed knowledge of those practices.236 By this logic, 
even the content of actual conversations could be revealed by a pen 
register, since the telephone company has the capacity to monitor 
conversations.237 
In sum, telephone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in PCTDDs that contain content. Society generally and Congress in 
particular have traditionally regarded the content of electronic 
communications as private. Further, telephone users do not voluntarily 
assume the risk that content transmitted via telephone in the form of a 
PCTDD will be revealed to the government. In light of this, the Fourth 
Amendment protects PCTDDs that contain content. Therefore, under the 
canon of avoidance, the Pen/Trap Statute should not be interpreted to 
permit the collection of content, since such an interpretation would bring 
the statute into conflict with the United States Constitution. 
III.  AMENDING THE PEN/TRAP STATUTE 
Interpreting the Pen/Trap Statute to permit the collection of 
content will create constitutional problems and may violate the Fourth 
  
 233 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43 (identifying commonly known reasons that a telephone 
company monitors dialed digits, including “to aid in the identification of persons making annoying 
or obscene calls”). 
 234 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 235 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43. 
 236 Id. at 745. 
 237 Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (A “telephone conversation itself must be 
electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be recorded or overheard by 
the use of other company equipment.”). Title III provides an exception for such practices. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006); see also In re United States for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen 
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. (E.D.N.Y. I), 
515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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Amendment.238 Although a preferable approach is to interpret the 
Pen/Trap Statute to prohibit the collection of content, to some extent this 
may limit the utility to law enforcement agencies of a valuable 
investigative tool.239 Both options have drawbacks. Therefore, the 
Pen/Trap Statute requires immediate attention from Congress.  
This Part identifies possible methods for amending the Pen/Trap 
Statute that balance the need to adequately protect privacy expectations 
with law enforcement’s ability to use pen registers in the course of 
conducting investigations. In Part A, this Note suggests several courses 
of action intended to redress the statutory ambiguity created by the 1994 
limitation. In Part B, this Note reiterates suggestions made by other 
commentators that apply to the Pen/Trap Statute more generally. 
A.  Amending the 1994 Limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) 
1. Articulate the Consequences of a Lack of Reasonably 
Available Technology  
The interpretive tension in the Pen/Trap Statute results from the 
interplay between the statutory definition of a pen register in 18 U.S.C. § 
3127(3) and the 1994 limitation reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c).240 The 
definition provides that pen registers shall not collect content. The 
limitation contains a positive commandment to use reasonably available 
technology to sort content from non-content, but fails to articulate the 
consequence of an absence of such technology. This failure allows the 
statute to be interpreted to permit the collection of content. 
If the limitation remains in the statute, then amending the 
limitation to include language that articulated the effect of an absence of 
reasonably available technology to sort content from non-content would 
effectively resolve the ambiguity of the statute. It would also end the 
divisive speculation into the effect of the limitation and the fruitless 
debate about Congress’s intention in passing the various amendments to 
the Pen/Trap Statute over the past several decades. 
Congress must articulate the effect of an absence of reasonably 
available sorting technology. To align the limitation with the 
considerations discussed in this Note, any additional statutory language 
should continue to reflect the policies of the PATRIOT Act and prohibit 
the collection of content. One option would be to provide that in the 
absence of reasonably available technology, the pen register shall be 
restricted to collecting the first ten digits of any numbers dialed. This 
  
 238 See supra Part II.D. 
 239 See E.D.N.Y. I, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339; see also S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 
(S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 240 See generally Part II.B.  
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would effectively prevent pen registers from collecting PCTDDs.241 The 
government currently possesses technology that enables it to record a 
specified number of dialed digits.242 Should the government utilize that 
technology to record ten digits, it could use those ten digits to identify 
calls that a telephone user placed to calling card companies. The 
government could in turn subpoena the calling card provider directly in 
order to determine the final destination to which the call was routed, 
rather than the telephone service provider, in order to collect non-content 
PCTDDs,243 to which it would be entitled under the Pen/Trap Statute. 
This solution would impose a greater administrative burden on 
the government. However, this burden would provide a positive 
incentive to develop technology to sort PCTDDs. The current statutory 
regime disincentives such research and development because the 
government faces no adverse consequences as a result of continuing to 
collect PCTDDs that contain content. In fact, the government may even 
have a perverse incentive to avoid developing technology to sort 
PCTDDs containing content from those that do not, in order to continue 
obtaining all PCTDDs for as long as possible.244 
2. Modify or Eliminate the Reasonably Available Technology 
Provision  
A second alternative is to modify the limitation by deleting the 
technology reasonably available exception. One significant benefit of 
this option is that it would minimize the risk of future constitutional 
violations by creating an unequivocal prohibition on the collection of 
content. For instance, the government’s interpretation of the Pen/Trap 
Statute would be diffused if Congress struck language from the current 
version of 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) in the following manner: 
(c) Limitation.—A government agency authorized to install and use a pen 
register or trap and trace device under this chapter or under State law shall use 
technology reasonably available to it that restricts the recording or decoding of 
electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic 
communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic 
communications.245 
  
 241 To date, one law enforcement agency adopted this strategy, agreeing to configure its 
computers to automatically delete all PCTDDs received from the telephone service provider. This 
mooted the legal question of whether the pen register could collect all PCTDDs. United States for an 
Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices (E.D.N.Y. II), No. 08-
308, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97359, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2008). 
 242 S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
 243 Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *13. 
 244 147 CONG. REC. 10,990, S11,000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1001) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 
see also Supp. Amicus Brief, July ‘07, supra note 170, at *36 n.13. 
 245  18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2006) (alterations to original). The alterations appearing in the 
block quote are intended to serve an illustrative purpose.  
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The drawback to this suggestion is that the limitation would be 
superfluous. Since the definition of a pen register excludes any device 
that is capable of collecting content, it goes without saying that the 
government should use technology that prevents it from collecting 
content when acting under the authority of the Pen/Trap Statute. If the 
limitation merely reiterated this conclusion, it may as well not be 
included in the statute. 
Therefore, another possibility that would confer the same benefit 
is to eliminate the limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(c) altogether. The 
limitation is unnecessary if the definition of a pen register contains a 
plain prohibition on the collection of content. Further, if no reasonably 
available technology can sort content from non-content, then the 
limitation does nothing but muddle the statutory text. The limitation only 
applies to a set of circumstances that do not exist. Meanwhile, the 
limitation creates ambiguity by failing to address the circumstances at 
hand. It appears that the primary function of the limitation is to create 
confusion. 
With the limitation removed from the statutory text, the statutory 
definition of a pen register would plainly prohibit the collection of 
content. While this result would temporarily decrease the utility of a pen 
register for law enforcement agencies, it would not prevent them from 
obtaining content-based PCTDDs pursuant to other valid methods. For 
instance, with a showing of probable cause, the government would still 
be able to obtain a wiretap warrant to intercept PCTDDs.246 In addition, 
the method of restricting the collection of digits dialed to ten would also 
be available. Further, as soon as the government developed technology to 
sort content from non-content, it would employ that technology to avoid 
collecting content, even without the limitation. In other words, the 
limitation is not an essential component of the Pen/Trap Statute and 
could be eliminated with no significant negative repercussions. 
B.  Broad Amendments to the Pen/Trap Statute  
1. Allow Judicial Review 
Currently, 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) provides that the court “shall” 
authorize a pen register upon certification by a government 
representative of its relevancy to an investigation.247 For so long as pen 
registers can collect content, Congress should amend this section in order 
to allow for judicial review during the consideration of a pen register 
  
 246 S.D. Tex. I, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 818; see also United States for an Order Authorizing 
the Installation and Use of an Elec. Computerized Data Collection Device Equivalent to a Pen 
Register and Trap and Trace Device, No. 06:06-mj-1130 at 6 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2006) (“[T]he 
government is not without a remedy: if it decides that obtaining post-cut-through digits is 
sufficiently important to its criminal investigation, it may submit a wiretap application.”). 
 247 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(b), 3123(a) (2006). 
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application. Senator Leahy has advocated that the standard for judicial 
review should be heightened to provide courts a degree of independent 
latitude.248 Instead of relying on a law enforcement agent’s certification 
that the digits sought to be collected are relevant to an investigation, the 
court could review the facts for itself to determine whether that was 
indeed the case. This solution will not minimize the likelihood that the 
use of a pen register will create a constitutional conflict, since pen 
registers will still be capable of collecting content. However, granting 
courts the power of judicial review will at least add oversight to the 
application process and may prevent the collection of content where the 
justification for such collection is weak. 
2. Heighten the Standard of Proof 
Alternatively, the House Judiciary Committee has proposed that 
Congress modify the Pen/Trap Statute to provide that before a pen 
register can be ordered and installed, the government must demonstrate 
“specific and articulable facts [that] reasonably indicate that a crime has 
been, is being, or will be committed, and [that] information likely to be 
obtained by such installation and use . . . is relevant to an investigation of 
that crime.”249 Another option suggested by one commentator is to raise 
the relevancy standard so that pen registers can only be authorized 
pursuant to a greater showing of suspicion, such as the “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard that applies to requests for disclosure of 
cable records under the Cable Communications Policy Act.250 It is clear 
that either of these options, if adopted, would improve the status quo. 
3. Provide a Suppression Remedy 
 If Congress does not eliminate the limitation, it should amend 
the Pen/Trap Statute with a provision that provides for the suppression of 
any PCTDDs collected or decoded by a pen register that represent 
content.251 Currently, the government is under no mandate to discard 
content collected with a pen register and courts routinely admit evidence 
collected by pen registers, even if that evidence was collected in an 
unlawful manner.252 Although the government’s official position is not to 
  
 248 147 CONG. REC. at S11,000 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 249 Id. (citing Report 106-932, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. 13, Oct. 4, 2000). The Bush 
Administration rejected adding this proposed language to the statute. Id. Another commentator has 
suggested amending the standard of proof in the context of Internet surveillance using a pen register. 
See Ditzion, supra note 12, at 1351 (“[A] higher standard for approving Internet pen register orders 
should be established.”). 
 250 Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1375, 1437 (2004). 
 251 See Ditzion, supra note 12, at 1348-49 (suggesting ways to clarify and improve pen 
register laws); see also Bankston, supra note 138, at 631. 
 252 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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make affirmative use of content, agents of the DOJ have also received 
instructions to store records of all content collected indefinitely.253 By 
amending the Pen/Trap Statute to mandate the suppression of content 
collected with a pen register, Congress would ensure that content 
collected under a mere relevance standard cannot be used against a 
telephone user. This would minimize the risk of harm flowing from the 
constitutional violation of collecting content with a pen register. It would 
also harmonize the Pen/Trap Statute with Title III, which provides for the 
suppression of the content of oral or wire communications intercepted 
unlawfully.254 
4. Increased Transparency About the Installation and Use of 
Pen Registers  
Any discussion of pen registers is limited by a lack of 
information.255 There is no meaningful account of the number of 
applications to install and use a pen register made each year. Likewise, 
there is no accessible record of the number of applications to install and 
use a pen register granted or denied by courts.256 Although anecdotal 
evidence indicates that law enforcement agencies install and operate 
thousands of pen registers each year,257 it is impossible to fully appreciate 
the significance of the government’s ability to collect content under the 
Pen/Trap Statute without knowing how often this practice occurs. To 
cure this lack of transparency, the Pen/Trap Statute should be updated to 
require an annual report about the government’s use of pen registers.258 
As with the proposed suppression remedy, Title III provides a 
fitting model for updating the reporting requirements of the Pen/Trap 
Statute.259 Congress should require the appropriate officials to report 
annually to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
comprehensive details about pen register applications,260 including the 
percentage of pen register orders that authorize the collection of all digits 
dialed from a particular telephone number, as distinguished from those 
orders that restrict the collection of PCTDDs to dialing information.261 
  
 253 Thompson Memo, supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 254 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006). 
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of electronic surveillance carried out under the authority of the Pen/Trap Statute). 
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Further, that office should forward a final report to Congress to allow for 
further consideration of the pen register issue.262 Knowing that detailed 
information was being compiled would presumably increase judicial 
awareness of the questionable uses to which pen registers can be put. In 
turn, this awareness might encourage meaningful discourse on the 
subject, as well as prompt Congressional action to more effectively 
balance the need for vigorous law enforcement with the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Telephone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
content of their electronic communications. This expectation includes 
content that takes the form of a PCTDD. The expectation is also one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. As with other forms of 
communicative content, interception of PCTDDs that contain content is 
not lawful on a showing of less than probable cause. For these reasons, 
the collection of content on the mere relevance standard provided by the 
Pen/Trap Statute should be prohibited.  
Nevertheless, until Congress takes steps to do so, the 
government will continue to solicit and receive court authorization to 
install and use pen registers in a manner that will result in the collection 
of content. The time is ripe for Congress to amend the Pen/Trap Statute 
in order to cure its ambiguities and impose an effective barrier to the 
continued practice of collecting PCTDDs that contain content using a 
pen register. 
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